Signature Management - The Key Term Everyone Overlooked in The UAPTF Report
Written by Sean Munger - Former Intelligence Analyst in the Marine Corps and a Practicing Attorney
I believe there is a disconnect between Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) researchers and the Intelligence Community (IC), due to misunderstanding of how the IC works and what its mission actually is.
There are lofty expectations and assumptions being made about the U.S. IC, which are not grounded in truth.
My intention is to utilize my background as a former Intelligence Analyst to help parties, which are interested in the UAP topic, better understand the evidence and reports presented by members of the current and former U.S. Government Intelligence Community.
Within this article I highlight a key term and attempt to explain its significance and potential impact on the UAP topic. In order to accomplish this, I will also attempt to explain some parts of the intelligence process in a basic, boiled down, and understandable format.
Signature Management
On June 25, 2021, I read through the Unclassified UAPTF (Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force) Report for the first time. Many of those within the UAP community were disappointed by the length of what ended up being a nine-page document.
Though I wish there was more detail, there are still language choices that have far reaching implications of what the U.S. Department of Defense’s Intelligence Community have been detecting.
“The UAPTF holds a small amount of data that appear to show UAP demonstrating acceleration or a degree of signature management.”
– UAPTF Report
What is Signature Management?
When used in military or defense context, a “signature” would be any manner of identification that can be detected by an adversary. Examples of what would be considered a signature would be a radar cross section, active or passive signals emitted, infrared emissions or even distinctions that can be seen visually, meaning an identification can be made.
Signature management would be a term used to indicate an active attempt to avoid or prevent detection. The term’s use in the UAPTF Report implies observed behaviors of UAP that show awareness of self and measures being taken to avoid detection. An acceleration could be suggestive that UAP are adapting to current or developed methods of detection.
Use of Signature Management
Civilian produced items rarely utilize methods of signature management. If anything, civilian items want their signature to be easily distinguishable for brand recognition purposes. One example of signature management on the civilian side of this coin would be scientific field work. The intent behind scientific field work designed to avoid detection would be to collect untainted data that would be created by the collector’s presence.
In contrast, military forces, equipment, and intelligence collection platforms utilize some form of signature management measures. Not all military and intelligence signature management efforts are for outright clandestine operations. Some efforts have the intent to mislead or confuse an observer of true capabilities or purpose of what or who is detected.
Publicly Disclosed Methods of Signature Management of UAP
A sample of signature management that is available to the public and has been presented by UAP thus far would be low visibility, instantaneous acceleration, as well as reported radar jamming.
During his interview on The Kevin Rose Show podcast, F-18 pilot Ryan Graves stated when his aircraft would merge with UAP radar tracks, “we’d almost never see them.” Graves added that he believed UAP would change altitude as they closed in. An abrupt change of altitude when an aircraft approached would be a behaviour presented by UAP that is an example of signature management.
“They acted as if they wanted nothing at all to do with us” – Kevin Day
Kevin Day has stated that the UAP observed in the 2004 Nimitz encounter in the vicinity of Catalina Island were moving in groups of five to ten at 28,000 feet and moving south at approximately 100 knots.
When Kevin Day vectored in an intercept by David Fravor and Alex Dietrich, Day reported that the UAP went from 28,000 feet to the surface of the water in 0.78 seconds, then traveled approximately 60 miles to the CAP point in less than 2 seconds. Furthermore, when the intercepts were no longer present, the UAP appeared to “regroup” to their previous positions at 28,000 feet and continued their track heading south at approximately 100 knots.
“You can see cues of jamming on both your radar and your FLIR tape” – Chad Underwood
Chad Underwood, who filmed one of the now famous FLIR videos made public, reported his aircraft radar being jammed during his encounter with a UAP in 2004. In an interview with Jeremy Corbell of Mystery Wire, Underwood stated that during his interaction, he attempted a lock, “and that’s when all kinds of funky things started happening.” There were indications of jamming before Underwood reported the UAP exiting the area at a high rate of speed.
Britt of Twitter handle @inf3rence, recently highlighted slides presented on Unidentified: Season 1, Episode 2, which stated, “little to no detectible signatures.” The episode that aired in June of 2019, briefly showed a slide with bulleted points of a few characteristics from events outlined above.
Above: A Significant Slide Captured from Unidentified: Season 1, Episode 2
Analysis
What Could UAP Signature Management Efforts Mean?
What is clear to me is that UAP, adversarial tech (China / Russia) or other, are here. They have a purpose and are conducting that purpose. As an analyst, I cannot help but take these few data sets and start looking for tactics, trends, and procedures (TTPs) of a potential player on the world chessboard.
Due to our military training areas being saturated with sensor systems, these UAP are being detected.
When UAP become aware of our detection, they attempt to mitigate our efforts and or leave the area. When aircraft leave the area or when UAP feels that it can safely return to whatever it was doing, it does so.
Simply put: They are here, they are doing something, they do not want to be detected or seen and are taking efforts to continue to do what they are doing while avoiding our methods of detection.
With the limited data sets available publicly, I have multiple information gaps that I want and admittedly need filled to conduct a proper analysis. As we interested parties know, the above are snippets of the available information to support the current assessment.
It is currently impossible to understand why UAP conduct the signature management behaviors they do with absolute certainty. However, there are two thoughts that come to the forefront of my mind that, if I were in an intelligence section, would attempt to confirm or deny.
UAP do not know our aircraft are coming and therefore wait until the last minute to maneuver to temporary “safer” location by either changing elevation and or leaving the area completely.
The UAP do not care we are coming and continues to do its “mission” until the very last possible opportunity, then maneuvers to avoid detection.
If either of these were true, implications of intent and assumptions of capabilities could be made. Personally, I may start to view UAP as less capable than I currently assume or even completely indifferent to us as a species.
Perhaps their detection area of incoming aircraft is not a great distance. If I had access to the raw data, I would look to the exact location of the inbound aircraft and compare it with radar information of when the UAP changed altitude.
With that distance, I would extrapolate a detection distance or maybe create a UAP “red line” perimeter. I would then attempt to confirm or deny that when an aircraft (stimuli) breaks the red line or detection zone, the UAP changes altitude and exits the area.
Once a red line is established, I now know how close I can get to the Russian, Chinese or Zeta Reticuli UAP, so that commanders could make decisions on how to collect more data on UAP for further analysis and hopefully, a proper identification.
Why Should Classified Information Methods and Sources Must Be Protected?
As I just demonstrated in the previous paragraph, if you gave me or my former intelligence section enough data points, we would be able to create likely predicted behaviors of our target. Armed with that predicted behavior, our commander would be able to make informed decisions in order defeat a target signature management efforts and eventually locate, close with and destroy the enemy by fire and manoeuvre.
This is exactly why I giggle and shake my head every time I read or hear an advocate demand the release of classified information on UAP. I know there is someone just like me, working in Russia and China, that wants to know the signatures, tactics, trends, procedures and capabilities of our sensor systems so that they can predict our behavior and kill our war fighters should the time come.
The fall of Kabul and reestablishment of Taliban control in Afghanistan should be a reminder to us all, the existence of UAP may matter to us, the UFO/UAP community, but their existences matter very little to the players vying for power and control around the world.
Where do we go from here? We Turn Information into Intelligence!
In my previous intelligence section workplaces, we would create different ‘Courses of Action’ or COAs of what we were collecting information on.
In simple terms, a COA would be predicted behavior based upon observations broken down into separate ‘indicators.’ When an observation is made that reflects an indicator, you would check off the box. As each indicator is collected, we were able to paint a more accurate picture of intent to help show what the target’s COA would likely be.
If we want to know the intent of UAP, then we or our intelligence community would need to establish a proper collection plan to confirm or deny each indicator. The indicators would in turn show which ‘Course of Action’ UAP are here to conduct.
I believe that we need to produce something similar for UAP; create multiple Courses of Action of UAP then list multiple indicators for each that will confirm or deny their Intent.
Example COA 1 – UAP pose a threat
o Hostile Action Taken by UAP
o UAP Utilized Active Methods to Avoid Detection
o Detected in Sensitive Area
o Injured / Damaged Equipment
o Injured / Damaged Personnel
o Etc.
Example COA 2 – UAP pose no threat
o UAP Took No Hostile Action
o UAP Utilized Passive Methods to Avoid Detection
o UAP Detected in Non-Sensitive / Non-Essential Area
o No Injured / Damaged Equipment
o No Injured / Damaged Personnel
o Etc.
These are just examples of possible COAs that can be created and as observations are made, a story board will emerge, and an intent could be developed.
(Thank you Joe Murgia @TheUfoJoe, Dave Beaty @dave_beaty, Britt @inf3rence, for responding my recent inquiries, as well as all investigators New and Old that have paved the way for further analysis).